Estimates of the structural budget balance of the Australian Government: 2001-02 to 2016-17 by unknown
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Estimates of the structural budget balance of the 
Australian Government 
2001-02 to 2016-17 
 
 
 
 
  
 
© Commonwealth of Australia 2013 
 
ISBN 978-0-9874429-2-5 (Printed version) 
ISBN 978-0-9874423-3-2 (HTML version) 
 
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 
3.0 Australia License. 
 
The details of this licence are available on the Creative Commons website: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/au/. 
 
  
Contents 
 
 
Foreword i 
Introduction 1 
Key findings 2 
Derivation of the structural budget balance 4 
Technical Appendix 12 
References 23 
 
i 
 
Foreword 
 
 
Under Section 64E of the Parliamentary Service Act 1999 (the Act) the Parliamentary Budget 
Officer is required to conduct, on his or her own initiative, research on and analysis of the 
budget and fiscal policy settings. 
The initial work plan of the Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO) published in October 2012 
indicated that as part of its self-initiated work program, the PBO would seek to throw more 
light on the underlying structure of the budget and the factors that could affect the 
sustainability of the budget over the medium to longer term.   
This report on “Estimates of the structural budget balance of the Australian Government: 
2001-02 to 2016-17” is the first in a series of reports that the PBO proposes to issue to help 
explain how underlying budgetary trends and discretionary fiscal policy decisions impact on 
the government’s fiscal position.   
The report focusses on movements in the estimated structural budget balance over the past 
decade and through the 2013-14 budget and forward estimates years.  Future reports will 
examine trends in the key drivers of the budget and their implications for the sustainability of 
the government’s fiscal position over the medium term.  
 
Phil Bowen PSM FCPA 
Parliamentary Budget Officer 
 
22 May 2013  
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Introduction 
The structural budget balance (SBB) is a partial measure of the sustainability of the budget.  
It shows the underlying position of the budget after adjusting the actual budget balance for 
the impacts of major cyclical and temporary factors.  The SBB reflects the impacts of 
underlying budgetary trends and discretionary fiscal policy decisions. 
Taken in isolation, the SBB does not provide a sufficient basis for short-term fine tuning of 
fiscal policy.  However, if estimated on a regular basis and considered together with other 
measures of budget sustainability, including the health of the government’s balance sheet and 
debt sustainability, the SBB is a useful additional tool that can help to inform the 
government’s fiscal policy stance over the medium term. 
The SBB is a measure that is widely reported by fiscal authorities and parliamentary budget 
organisations in many advanced economies.  International institutions, including the OECD 
and the IMF, also publish estimates of the SBB for member countries. 
In this report, the Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO) has prepared estimates of the SBB over 
the period 2001-02 to 2016-17.  Because of the uncertainties surrounding the estimates of 
certain key variables in the calculation of the SBB, in particular the structural level of the 
terms of trade, the PBO’s estimates of the SBB are presented within a plausible band rather 
than as point estimates.  
The upper bound of the SBB estimates has been chosen to moderate the record high growth 
that occurred in the terms of trade over the period 2003-04 to 2011-12.  The lower bound 
recognises that the terms of trade is likely to remain above its long-term average, in particular 
due to the continuing rise of China as a major economic power. 
The PBO’s estimates of the SBB exclude the impact of the economic cycle, the temporary 
fiscal stimulus in response to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and the more extreme 
movements in the terms of trade.   
The estimates have been prepared using internationally accepted methodologies.  They 
incorporate the latest economic forecasts and budget estimates published in the 2013-14 
Budget.   
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Key findings 
The Parliamentary Budget Office’s structural budget balance estimates 
The PBO’s estimates of the SBB are shown in Figure 1 below. 
Figure 1:  Historical and forecast estimates of the SBB, 2001-02 to 2016-17 
 
Source: PBO, Budget Papers, ABS. 
The estimated SBB declined steadily over the period 2002-03 to 2011-12.  From a structural 
surplus in the range of 1¾ to 3¼ per cent of GDP in 2002-03, the estimated SBB moved into 
structural balance briefly somewhere in the period 2006-07 to 2007-08 before falling to a 
structural deficit of around 3¼ to 4¼ per cent of GDP in 2011-12.  It then showed a sharp 
improvement in 2012-13 with the structural deficit recovering to around 1½ to 2¾ per cent of 
GDP.  Based on the latest budget estimates further improvement is expected from 2013-14 
with the structural deficit in 2016-17 estimated at between ¼ and 1½ per cent of GDP.  
Key drivers of the structural budget balance 
These trends in the SBB estimates can be explained by changes in the structural levels of 
government receipts and payments.  From the SBB peak in 2002-03 to its trough in 2011-12, 
the structural level of receipts excluding GST fell by around 5 percentage points of GDP.  
The structural level of government payments excluding GST over this period rose by around 
1 percentage point of GDP and hence the SBB fell into deficit1.  Over the period 2011-12 to 
2016-17 the structural level of receipts is expected to increase by approximately 1¾ 
percentage points of GDP while the structural level of payments is expected to decline by 
                                                          
1 As GST receipts are paid to the States and Territories there is no net impact on the Budget bottom line over 
time.  Over the period 2002-03 to 2011-12, GST receipts fell by around ¾ of a percentage point of GDP as 
household savings rates jumped post-GFC and the proportion of expenditure on items that attract GST declined.  
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around 1 percentage point of GDP leading to the expected reduction in the structural deficit 
over the period of the 2013-14 budget and forward estimates years. 
Over two thirds of the 5 percentage points of GDP decline in structural receipts over the 
period 2002-03 to 2011-12 was due to the cumulative effect of the successive personal 
income tax cuts granted between 2003-04 and 2008-09.  A further quarter was the result of a 
decline in excise and customs duties as a proportion of GDP.  Significant factors driving this 
trend included the abolition of petroleum fuels excise indexation in the 2001-02 Budget and 
the decline in the consumption of cigarettes and tobacco over the period.  In contrast, the 
structural level of company tax receipts as a proportion of GDP remained relatively stable 
over the period.  The estimated 1¾ percentage point increase in structural receipts over the 
period 2011-12 to 2016-17 is mainly the result of increasing personal tax receipts due to the 
impact of bracket creep (fiscal drag) and the net effect of government policy decisions.  A 
further contributor to the increase in the structural level of receipts is the introduction of the 
Carbon Pricing Mechanism and the Minerals Resource Rent Tax in 2012-13. 
Contributing to the decline in the estimated structural deficit over the period of the 2013-14 
budget and forward estimates years is the impact of the savings that have been identified to 
fund the National Plan for School Improvement and DisabilityCare Australia.  This is 
because the level of savings over this period is greater than the costs of these schemes.  
Beyond the forward estimates years, however, these savings will be largely consumed by the 
costs of the schemes and, therefore, they will no longer be available to alleviate pressure on 
the SBB. 
Implications of the structural budget balance 
Under the Charter of Budget Honesty Act 1998 Australian governments must specify their 
long-term fiscal objectives within which shorter-term fiscal policy will be framed.  Since the 
adoption of the Charter of Budget Honesty, successive governments have sought either to 
maintain budget balance on average over the course of the economic cycle or to achieve 
surpluses on average over the medium term. By abstracting from cyclical and temporary 
factors, regular estimation of the SBB could help inform the likelihood of governments being 
able to achieve their long-term fiscal objectives. 
The SBB, viewed in the context of the health of the government’s balance sheet, is also an 
indicator of the underlying strength of the government’s fiscal position and its capacity to 
respond to adverse economic and fiscal shocks.  The PBO’s analysis suggests that the budget 
has been in structural deficit since 2006-07 or 2007-08 and that, while declining, the 
structural deficit will persist at least until 2016-17.  At the same time, the government’s 
balance sheet is in a strong position.  The level of government net debt, which in the 2013-14 
Budget is forecast to peak at 11.4 per cent of GDP in 2014-15, is low by international 
standards.  This provides a degree of fiscal space for the government to continue to address 
the underlying structure of the budget and maintain its sustainability.  
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Derivation of the structural budget balance 
Defining the structural budget balance 
The SBB is the actual budget balance adjusted for cyclical and other temporary factors.  It 
provides a measure of how underlying budgetary trends and discretionary changes in fiscal 
policy impact on the budget balance. 
Structural Budget Balance (SBB) = Actual Budget Balance – Cyclical Component – Other 
Temporary Factors  
The economic cycle impacts on tax revenue and government expenditure through the 
operation of the so called automatic stabilisers, tax revenue and unemployment benefit 
payments.  The cyclically-adjusted budget balance adjusts the actual budget balance for the 
impact of these factors.  Other temporary factors will also influence tax revenue and 
government expenditure.  Such factors might include changes in asset and commodity prices, 
changes in output composition, and large one-off revenue and expenditure impacts.  
Cyclically-adjusted budget balance 
The details of how the cyclically-adjusted budget balance (CAB) is calculated are contained 
in the technical appendix to this report.  In summary it is first necessary to remove the 
cyclical component of the actual budget balance (the actual budget balance used in this 
analysis is the underlying cash balance).  To do this an estimate is made of the extent to 
which the actual output of the economy is either above or below the economy’s potential 
output, that is output produced when the economy is operating at full capacity, consistent 
with stable inflation.   
This measure of the deviation of actual output from potential output is referred to as the 
output gap and is expressed as a percentage of potential output.  A positive output gap occurs 
when actual output is above its estimated potential while a negative output gap occurs when 
actual output is below its estimated potential.  
Output Gap = (Actual Output – Potential Output)/Potential Output x 100 
Having derived an estimate of the output gap it is then necessary to determine the impact of 
the output gap on the budget balance by estimating the sensitivity of tax revenue and 
government expenditure to this gap.  This sensitivity is referred to as an elasticity and 
measures the degree to which the level of tax revenue and government expenditure will 
change as a result of a change in the output gap.       
While the sensitivity of tax revenue to the output gap can be estimated using total tax 
revenue, a more accurate result is achieved by disaggregating total tax revenue into its major 
components because different components have different economic drivers.  In this analysis 
individual revenue elasticities have been derived for personal income tax and company tax.   
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Total government expenditure is treated as almost entirely structural with the exception of 
unemployment benefit payments and the temporary fiscal stimulus spending in response to 
the GFC.   
The CAB is presented in Figure 2.  This estimate includes an adjustment for the impact of 
large asset price movements on capital gains tax (details are contained in the technical 
appendix). 
Figure 2:  Historical and forecast estimates of the budget balance adjusted for the 
economic cycle, 2001-02 to 2016-17 
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Source: PBO, Budget Papers, ABS. 
The results suggest that the CAB was in surplus for most of the past decade.  It was broadly 
flat up to the middle part of the past decade, generally following the profile of the actual 
budget balance.  The CAB surplus declined from 2005-06 and, following the onset of the 
GFC, fell to a deficit of around 3¾ per cent of GDP in 2009-10.   From this position the 
deficit slowly recovered in line with developments in the actual budget balance as the 
temporary fiscal stimulus was withdrawn.  Over the forward estimates, the CAB is expected 
to move into a small surplus in 2016-17.  The reason for such a close correspondence 
between the actual budget balance and the estimated CAB reflects the estimates of the output 
gap over this period.  
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Figure 3:  Historical and forecast estimates of the output gap, 2001-02 to 2016-17 
 
Source: PBO, Budget Papers, ABS. 
The output gap was positive through most of the early and middle parts of the past decade 
thus resulting in the cyclically-adjusted budget surpluses being slightly smaller than the 
actual budget surpluses.  Over the period 2008-09 to 2011-12 following the GFC, in contrast 
to most other advanced economies, the output gap has been only slightly negative and thus 
the cyclically adjusted budget deficits have been slightly smaller than the actual budget 
deficits.  Over the forward estimates years the CAB is forecast to improve as the negative 
output gap closes. 
Removing the temporary fiscal stimulus   
The movement in the CAB from surplus to deficit from 2007-08 to 2009-10 was heavily 
influenced by the temporary fiscal stimulus spending in response to the GFC.  While clearly 
discretionary, such a large fiscal policy measure masks the underlying trend in the CAB and 
SBB.  The IMF (2011) suggests that to gain a better understanding of the trend in the CAB 
and the SBB, major revenue and expenditure items that are clearly temporary (one-off) 
should be removed.   
Accordingly, given the extraordinary nature of the circumstances that led to the fiscal 
stimulus, its large size and, most importantly, its temporary nature, the analysis removes the 
fiscal stimulus from the estimates of the CAB and SBB.  It should be noted that while the 
fiscal stimulus spending has been excluded as a one-off item, the associated ongoing rise in 
debt interest payments has been retained.  
To determine the size and profile of the fiscal stimulus, the spending packages identified in 
Treasury (2009) were examined and adjusted to ensure that the fiscal stimulus only included 
spending and revenue items that were one-off in nature.  The size of the temporary fiscal 
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2010-11 and $5 billion in 2011-12.  Figure 4 displays the profile of the CAB excluding the 
fiscal stimulus. 
Figure 4:  Historical and forecast estimates of the budget balance adjusted for the economic 
cycle and the fiscal stimulus, 2001-02 to 2016-17 
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Source: PBO, Budget Papers, ABS. 
The removal of the fiscal stimulus results in a smaller CAB deficit over the period 2009-10 to 
2011-12 with the trough of 2¼ per cent of GDP pushed out to 2011-12. 
Adjusting for the terms of trade  
The dramatic rise in the terms of trade over the past decade has significantly boosted national 
incomes and hence tax revenues.  While it is likely that the terms of trade will not fall back to 
its long term average it is also likely that only part of the rise in the terms of trade is 
structural.  Thus an adjustment to the actual budget balance is required to remove the 
temporary component of the terms of trade.  This is a difficult task and requires an 
assessment of the level that the terms of trade will converge to over the next few years as 
demand and supply for Australia’s iron ore and coal commodities align.   
The increase in Australia’s terms of trade over the period from 2003-04 until 2011-12 has 
been dramatic by historical and international standards as displayed in Figure 5 from the 
Treasury (2012) forecasting review.  Indeed, as noted by Treasury the rise in the terms of 
trade has been exceptional when compared with other advanced and commodity exporting 
countries. 
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Figure 5:  Terms of trade, by country 
 
Source: Treasury. 
The process of urbanisation in Asia combined with the region’s rapid growth, 
industrialisation and infrastructure building has resulted in strong demand for energy and 
mineral resources.  The Chinese economy has been at the forefront of these developments 
and has led this growth in demand for resources.  For Australia, this strong demand resulted 
in a rapid rise in the prices of commodities, particularly iron ore and coal, through most of the 
past decade resulting in a strong sustained surge in the terms of trade and a significant 
contribution to national income.  While it appears that iron ore and coal prices and thus the 
terms of trade peaked in late 2011 the strong demand for energy and mineral resources is 
expected to continue for some years to come as the Asian economies continue to grow and 
transform.      
Sustained high energy and mineral prices have resulted in a global resources investment 
boom as resources companies have sought to increase production to meet this sustained 
demand.   
Both demand and supply developments will impact on the price outlook for resources.  While 
there are many short-term forecasts of commodity prices, to the PBO’s knowledge there have 
been no detailed studies that attempt to estimate the structural level of these commodity 
prices and therefore by implication the structural level of Australia’s terms of trade. 
In the absence of a well-researched point estimate of the structural terms of trade, an 
approach that adopts a range of estimates of the structural terms of trade and therefore the 
SBB adjusted for the terms of trade effect is appropriate to reflect this uncertainty.  
McDonald et al (2010) adopted an assumption that the structural terms of trade was 
20 per cent above the 30 year average.  Recognising the arbitrary nature of this assumption, 
the authors also produced a 20 per cent bound and a 40 per cent upper bound for the terms of 
trade around their central estimate.   
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The lower bound of the structural terms of trade adopted by the PBO in this report is a 
historical average calculated over the period 1989-90 to 2011-12.  This is a conservative 
estimate and suggests that most of the rise in the terms of trade seen over the period 2003-04 
to 2011-12 was temporary despite the dramatic changes occurring in the Asian region. 
Determining the upper bound for the structural terms of trade is more problematic.  For this 
report the PBO has taken the average of the terms of trade over the period 2003-04 to 
2011-12 which captures the period over which the terms of trade rose most strongly.  This 
assumption reflects a view that the changes witnessed in the Asian region have raised the 
structural level of Australia’s terms of trade but the extent of the recent rise is partly 
temporary.  Figure 6 highlights the actual and the 2013-14 Budget forecast terms of trade, 
and the PBO’s chosen range of the structural terms of trade.  
Figure 6:  Australia’s terms of trade, 1983-84 to 2029-30 
 
Source: PBO, Budget Papers, ABS. 
The upper and lower terms of trade scenarios are used to derive the band within which the 
SBB estimates are most likely to occur.  The PBO has followed the OECD (2006) and 
Barnett et al (2010) methodologies to calculate the income gap which is a combined measure 
of the output gap, already discussed, and the terms of trade gap, that is the gap between the 
actual terms of trade and the structural terms of trade.  Given there are two structural terms of 
trade estimates (one for each of the lower and upper bounds) there are also two income gap 
estimates.  
Income Gap = Real Output Gap + Share of Exports to GDP x (Terms of Trade – Structural 
Terms of Trade)  
Given the two income gap estimates (due to the two structural terms of trade estimates) and 
the short period over which it is estimated that the structural level of the terms of trade has 
changed, the PBO has chosen not to estimate tax revenue elasticities with respect to the 
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income gaps.  Instead the estimated tax revenue elasticities with respect to the output gap 
(used earlier to derive the CAB) are applied to the income gaps to determine structural 
receipts.  This approach assumes that the individual receipt components have the same 
sensitivity to the output gap and the income gap.   
Figure 7 shows estimates of the SBB reflecting the adjustments to the actual budget balance 
for the economic cycle, asset prices, the temporary fiscal stimulus and the terms of trade.  
This is the same chart that appears as Figure 1 in the key findings section of this report. 
Figure 7:  Historical and forecast estimates of the SBB, 2001-02 to 2016-17 
 
Source: PBO, Budget Papers, ABS. 
The estimated SBB declined steadily over the period 2002-03 to 2011-12.  From a structural 
surplus in the range of 1¾ to 3¼ per cent of GDP in 2002-03, the estimated SBB moved into 
structural balance briefly somewhere in the period 2006-07 to 2007-08 before falling to a 
structural deficit of around 3¼ to 4¼ per cent of GDP in 2011-12.  It then showed a sharp 
improvement in 2012-13 with the structural deficit recovering to around 1½ to 2¾ per cent of 
GDP.  Based on the latest budget estimates further improvement is expected from 2013-14 
with the structural deficit in 2016-17 estimated at between ¼ and 1½ per cent of GDP.  
Uncertainty of the CAB and SBB estimates 
Estimates of the CAB and SBB are sensitive to estimates of the output gap, elasticity values 
and other key assumptions such as the assumed structural level of the terms of trade.   
There are many approaches to estimating potential GDP and therefore the output gap estimate 
can vary depending on the approach adopted.  The estimation used to calculate the elasticities 
is also subject to uncertainty.  Testing of these uncertainties (contained in the technical 
appendix) shows that estimates of the CAB are only moderately impacted by differences in 
estimates of the output gap and elasticity values.  
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The main degree of uncertainty arises from the assumed structural level of the terms of trade.  
Given this uncertainty, the analysis presents estimates of the structural level of the terms of 
trade and, therefore, the SBB within a plausible band rather than as point estimates. 
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Technical Appendix 
Detailed methodology 
This appendix contains the details of the estimation of the CAB and the SBB.  It is divided 
into five parts including estimating potential output, estimating the elasticities, adjusting 
capital gains tax receipts, examining uncertainty, and presenting a comparison with other 
recent estimates of the SBB for Australia by the OECD and IMF. 
Estimating potential GDP 
The first step in calculating the SBB is to estimate the economy’s level of potential real GDP 
(output) and then calculate the output gap (ie the gap between potential and actual real GDP).  
Given that potential output is not observable it has to be estimated.  There are many methods 
that can be employed to estimate potential output which range in complexity.  Approaches 
include statistical filtering through to fully specified models that are econometrically 
estimated.  Depending on the approach adopted and the data used, estimates of potential 
output and therefore the output gap can vary for the same economy.  A comparison of 
estimates is discussed later in the appendix. 
This report adopts the commonly used approach of deriving potential output from a 
two-factor Cobb-Douglas economy-wide production function of actual output.  This approach 
has been adopted as it is intuitively easier to understand what is influencing potential output 
than approaches using multivariate and/or Kalman filtering and econometric estimation of a 
production function.  An area of further work would be to fully explore the range of 
techniques for estimating potential output.   
This Cobb-Douglas approach can be expressed in the following form:   
Real GDP (output) = 0.6 x Hours Worked + (1 - 0.6) x Capital Stock + Total Factor 
Productivity 
To calculate potential output and therefore the output gap it is necessary to derive trends of 
the three inputs used in the production function, namely the capital stock, total hours worked 
and total factor productivity.  The capital stock is assumed to be at its trend. 
Total hours worked can be broken down into its key components of average hours, the 
unemployment rate, the participation rate and the working age population.  The following 
formula defines the calculation for trend total hours: 
Trend hours worked = (working age population x trend participation rate x (1 - trend 
unemployment rate) x trend average weekly hours worked) x 52 
It can be seen from the formula that all of the variables are expressed in trend terms with the 
exception of the working age population.  The charts below highlight the trend adjustment 
applied to each of the other components using the Hodrick-Prescott filter with the smoothing 
13 
parameter (lambda) set to 100.  The unemployment rate and the participation rate utilise the 
2013-14 Budget medium-term projections to address the end-point problem of the filter.  This 
provides a further 10 years of data out to 2029-30 over which to run the filter.   
Figure 8:  Australia’s unemployment rate, 1978-79 to 2016-17 
 
Source: PBO, Budget Papers, ABS. 
Figure 9:  Australia’s participation rate, 1978-79 to 2016-17 
 
Source: PBO, Budget Papers, ABS. 
Average hours worked are smoothed over history and then assumed to remain at their 
2011-12 trend level over the forward estimates period. 
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Figure 10:  Australia’s average hours worked per week, 1978-79 to 2016-17 
 
Source: PBO, ABS. 
The final component that needs to be de-trended is total factor productivity which is 
calculated as the residual from the production function equation as follows: 
Total Factor Productivity = Real GDP (output) - 0.6 x Hours Worked - (1 - 0.6) x Capital 
Stock 
Actual total factor productivity is then smoothed using the same technique as applied to 
smooth the unemployment rate and the participation rate.  
Over the forward estimates period a number of inputs are needed to construct potential 
output.  The capital stock uses a combination of the forecasts of total investment and an 
assumed profile for the depreciation rate based on the historical trend.  Trend total hours use 
forecasts of the working age population and an assumption that trend average working hours 
remain constant.  
As mentioned, various estimation techniques can lead to different estimates of potential 
output and the output gap.  Figure 11 compares the PBO, OECD and IMF estimates of the 
output gap.  An additional complication in this comparison is that the OECD and IMF 
estimates of the output gap are on a calendar year basis.  The OECD and IMF use a 
production function approach similar to the PBO.   
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Figure 11:  Comparison of estimates of Australia’s output gap calculated by the PBO, IMF 
and OECD, 1978-79 to 2011-122 
 
Source: PBO, IMF, OECD. 
While the broad trend in the output gap estimates are similar (the early 1980s and 1990s are 
periods when the economy is estimated to have operated below potential while the mid-2000s 
is a period when the economy is estimated to have operated above its potential) there are 
obviously some differences in the assumptions, trend adjustments and data which will explain 
the slight differences in the magnitudes of the output gap.   
These differences in the estimates of the output gap will have an impact on estimates of the 
SBB.  The section on uncertainty later in the report attempts to quantify this difference by 
comparing estimates of the SBB using the PBO and OECD estimates of the output gap.  
Estimating tax receipts and government payments elasticities 
Having derived an estimate of the output gap the next step is to estimate the sensitivity of tax 
revenue and government expenditure to this measure of the economic cycle.  This sensitivity 
(the elasticity) can be quantified through a number of approaches, which are outlined below, 
and provide a measure of the degree to which tax revenue and government expenditure are 
expected to change as a result of a change in the output gap.  By way of example, 
McDonald et al (2010) assumed an aggregate tax revenue elasticity of 1¼, so for every 
percentage point increase in the output gap, tax revenue increases by 1¼ percentage points. 
There are two main approaches employed to formalise these relationships.  The United 
Kingdom’s Office of Budget Responsibility (Helgadottir et al (2012)) provides a useful 
discussion of the two approaches which it refers to as the one-step and two-step approaches.  
The one-step approach involves econometric estimation of the relationship between total tax 
revenue (policy-adjusted) and total government expenditure and the output gap.  These 
                                                          
2 The IMF and OECD estimates are on a calendar year basis. 
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elasticities are then used to adjust total tax revenue and government expenditure for the 
economic cycle.  
The two-step approach, which is adopted in this report, estimates the relationship between tax 
revenue and its tax base, ei,bi, and then the tax base to the output gap, ebi,ygap.  This approach 
allows for a more detailed examination of the estimated elasticity.  An additional degree of 
detail, again adopted in this report, is to disaggregate total tax revenue into major categories 
and estimate their respective elasticities.  This approach should help to improve the accuracy 
of the elasticity estimates given that each tax revenue type may have different economic 
drivers and may evolve differently. 
The relationships can be defined as: 
SBB = (Ti* - G*)/Y* 
Ti* = (Y*/Y)ei,ygap  . Ti 
G* = (Y*/Y)eg,ygap . G 
ei,ygap = ei,bi . ebi,ygap  
eg,ygap = eg,U . eU,ygap 
where 
T and G are actual tax receipts and government payments, Y is output and e refers to the 
respective elasticities.  The * denotes structural variables.  
Previous elasticity estimates have been derived by the Girouard et al (2005) and OECD 
(2006) and McDonald et al (2010) for Australia.  The IMF uses the Girouard et al (2005) 
elasticity estimates to calculate its measure of Australia’s SBB. 
Girouard et al (2005) provides a detailed analysis in which the authors disaggregate total tax 
revenue into four categories from which elasticities are then derived.  This report updates 
these elasticity estimates using the approach outlined above.  A nuance in this analysis is to 
identify GST revenue separately from other indirect taxes and to separate out capital gains 
tax.  
Estimating the elasticity of tax to the tax base (ei,bi) 
For the elasticity of personal income tax the PBO’s personal income tax micro simulation 
model has been used.  It analyses a one per cent sample of 2009-10 individual tax returns 
sourced from the Australian Taxation Office.  This approach in estimating the personal 
income elasticity recognises the progressive nature of personal income tax in Australia and is 
expressed in the following formula. 
 
17 
eincome tax,earnings = ∑w.Marginal Tax Rate of the Individual/∑w.Average Tax Rate of the 
Individual 
w is the weight of income for each individual to total income 
For 2009-10 the elasticity is 1.5, identical to that calculated by the Girouard et al (2005). 
Other tax types are assumed to have an elasticity of tax revenue with respect to their 
respective tax bases of 1.0 following the OECD. 
Estimating the elasticity of the tax base to the output gap (ebi,ygap) 
The estimation of these elasticities is an empirical question which attempts to capture how 
respective tax bases respond to the economic cycle over time.  Estimates of these elasticities 
are derived from the estimated relationship between the respective tax base and the output 
gap.  The tax receipt bases used are a broad definition of household incomes (compensation 
of employees, gross mixed income, and property income) and total corporate gross operating 
surplus.  In this approach no attempt is made to estimate the structural tax bases. They are 
treated as unobservable.   
A different approach from the output gap is to attempt to measure the ‘gap’ in each tax 
revenue base and thus attempt to more closely capture composition changes in the economy.  
This approach was pioneered by the European Central Bank (2001).  While having some 
appeal, this method lacks a theoretical basis as there is no equivalent to an output gap for 
individual tax bases. 
To estimate the relationships between the separate tax bases of household income and total 
gross operating surplus the equation takes the following form: 
∆log(Xt/Y*t) = a0 + a1∆log(Yt/Y*t) + et 
where X is household income or total gross operating surplus as a ratio of potential nominal 
output (since the actual GDP deflator is used to reflate both actual and potential GDP, the 
nominal tax base can be expressed relative to nominal potential output).  These relationships 
have been estimated using the Newey-West correction for possible autocorrelation. 
The results of the estimation are broadly consistent with past studies.   
While it is demonstrated later in the appendix that the elasticity values do not significantly 
impact on the SBB estimates, closer investigation of the relationships is a potential area for 
further work.  
Estimating the elasticity of unemployment related expenditure 
Unemployment benefit payments are assumed to be strictly proportional to unemployment.  
This assumption translates into estimating the relationship between the cyclical component of 
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unemployment and the output gap to derive the sensitivity of cyclical unemployment to the 
economic cycle and therefore to unemployment benefit payments.   
To estimate the elasticity of the cyclical component of unemployment to the output gap the 
equation takes the following form: 
∆log(Ut/Ut*) = b0 + b1∆log(Yt/Yt*) + et 
where U is actual unemployment, U* is trend unemployment, Y is actual output and Y* is 
potential output. 
To obtain the elasticity of total expenditure to the output gap the estimated elasticity from 
above is weighted by the share of unemployment benefit payments to total payments.  The 
total elasticity is calculated to be -0.15.  
Summary of the elasticity results 
Table 1 provides a summary of the results.  The updated estimates remain close to the 
Girouard et al (2005) estimates with the only difference being a slightly higher updated 
estimate for the elasticity of personal income tax to the output gap.  This outcome is 
consistent with Parkyn (2010) study which compared the Girouard et al (2005) estimates to 
updated results for New Zealand.  Indeed, the IMF in its analysis of SBBs still uses the 
Girouard et al (2005) estimated elasticities for all countries. 
Table 1: Summary of elasticity estimates 
Tax to tax base Tax base to output gap Combined Tax share
Personal tax
PBO 1.5 1.0 1.5 43.6
OECD (2005) 1.5 0.7 1.0
Company tax
PBO 1.0 1.4 1.4 18.7
OECD (2005) 1.0 1.5 1.5
Most other taxes are assumed to have an elasticity of 1 with respect to the economic cycle.
Total tax
PBO 1.0
Treasury (2010) 1¼
U to output gap Combined U payment share
Payments
PBO -6.3 -0.15 2.4
OECD (2005) -5.3 -0.16 3.0
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Capital gains tax 
Capital gains are a small and volatile component of tax revenue.  The volatility reflects 
movements in asset prices and variability in realisation rates and the extent to which capital 
losses are offset against capital gains.  Given how difficult it would be to determine a 
structural level of asset prices the approach adopted by McDonald et al (2010) is used in this 
analysis to gain an estimate of the appropriate adjustment to actual capital gains tax revenue.  
Figure 12 highlights the adjustment to capital gains tax for each year, with the blue line 
showing actual capital gains tax receipts and the red line showing the adjusted capital gains 
tax receipts used to construct estimates of the SBB. 
Figure 12: Actual and adjusted capital gains tax revenue, 2001-02 to 2011-12 
 
Source: PBO, Budget Papers. 
Assessing uncertainty 
The calculations of the CAB and SBB involve uncertainty.  That is not to say that estimates 
are not useful in helping understand current trends in the stance of fiscal policy and the 
implications of the current position in terms of future fiscal policy.  However, it is important 
to recognise that there is a degree of uncertainty attached to the estimates.  
The uncertainty attached to the output gap measure and the elasticity values is discussed 
below. 
The output gap  
Estimates of potential output are subject to uncertainty as they depends on the methodology 
adopted and, potentially, the data used.  While not within the scope of this report other 
studies have highlighted these differences.  Parkyn (2010) provides a useful discussion and 
example of the differences that can arise in estimates of potential output by comparing the 
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Hodrick-Prescott filter, a multivariate filter, the Kalman filter and production function 
methodologies. 
As an example, Figure 13 highlights the estimates of the CAB using the PBO’s estimate of 
Australia’s output gap, an output gap calculated using the Hodrick-Prescott filter on actual 
real GDP to estimate potential GDP and the OECD’s recent estimate of Australia’s output 
gap.  The differences in the output gap measures lead to differences in the magnitude of the 
estimates of the CAB which is displayed as the band in Figure 13, by on average a ¼ 
percentage point of GDP, but have no significant impact on the trend of the CAB. 
Figure 13:  Australia’s CAB estimates using different output gap estimates,  
2001-02 to 2011-12 
 
Source: PBO, Budget Papers, ABS. 
Elasticities 
The elasticities used in the report are either directly estimated or adopted from the OECD 
estimates and therefore may not represent the ‘true’ value.  To test the sensitivity of the CAB 
to different values of the elasticities a 95 per cent confidence interval of the personal income 
tax elasticity has been constructed and then a high and low value for the CAB has been 
derived.  Figure 14 highlights that while there are differences as represented by the band, the 
CAB is not particularly sensitive to the magnitude of the estimated or assumed elasticities. 
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Figure 14:  Australia’s CAB estimates based on a 95 per cent confidence interval of the 
personal income tax elasticity, 2001-02 to 2011-12 
 
Source: PBO, Budget Papers, ABS. 
A comparison with other recent estimates of Australia’s structural budget balances 
Estimates of Australia’s SBB have been produced by a number of agencies.  Most recently 
both the OECD (2012) and IMF (2013) have published point estimates.  
McDonald et al (2010) published point estimates and discussed the issue of uncertainty in 
determining the fundamental level of the terms of trade and the Non-Accelerating Inflation 
Rate of Unemployment, that is, the unemployment rate at which inflation is stable.   
Figure 15 highlights the profile of the recent OECD and IMF estimates of Australia’s 
whole-of-government SBBs.  It should be noted that these estimates were prepared before the 
2013-14 Budget update.  Each of the estimates displays a similar profile. 
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Figure 15:  Australia’s SBB estimates, PBO, IMF (2013) and OECD (2012), 2001-02 to 
2016-173 
 
Source: PBO, Budget Papers, ABS, IMF, OECD. 
                                                          
3 The IMF and OECD estimates are on a calendar year basis and are as a percentage of potential GDP. 
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
01-02 04-05 07-08 10-11 13-14 16-17
% GDP % GDP 
PBO IMF OECD
Forecasts 
23 
References 
Australian Government, 2013, Budget Strategy and Outlook 2013-14, Budget Paper No. 1, Canberra. 
Barnett, R., and Matier, C., 2010, Estimating Potential GDP and the Government's Structural Budget 
Balance, Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer, Ottawa. 
Bartlett, R., Cameron, S., Lao, H., and Matier, C., 2012, Fiscal Sustainablity Report 2012, Office of 
the Parliamentary Budget Officer, Ottawa. 
Bornhorst, F., Dobrescu, G., Fedelino, A., Gottschalk, J., and Taisuke, N., 2011, When and How to 
Adjust Beyond the Business Cycle? A Guide to Structural Fiscal Balances, International Monetary 
Fund, Washington. 
Bouthevillain, C., Cour-Thimann, P., Van Den Dool, G., Hernandez De Cos, P., Langenus, G., Mohr, 
M., Momigliano, S., and Tujula, M., 2001, Cyclically-adjusted Budget Balances: An Alternative 
Approach, European Central Bank, Working Paper No. 77, Frankfurt. 
Escolano, J., 2010, A Practical Guide to Public Debt Dynamics, Fiscal Sustainability, and Cyclical 
Adjustment of Budgetary Aggregates, International Monetary Fund, Washington. 
Ford, B., 2005, Structural fiscal indicators: an overview, Treasury Economic Roundup, Autumn, 
Canberra. 
Giorno, C., Richardson, P., Roseveare, D., van den Noord, P., 1995, Estimating Potential Output, 
Output Gaps and Structural Budget Balances, OECD Economics Department Working Papers No. 
152, Paris. 
Girouard, N., and Andre, C., 2005, Measuring Cyclically-adjusted Budget Balances for OECD 
Countries, OECD Economics Department Working Papers Nos. 434, Paris. 
Girouard, N., and Price, R., 2004, Asset price cycles, "one-off" factors and structural budget balances, 
OECD Economics Department Working Papers No. 391, Paris. 
Helgadottir, T., Chamberlin, G., Dhami, P., Farrington, S., and Robins, J., 2012, Cyclically adjusting 
the public finances. United Kingdom: Office for Budget Responsibility, Working paper No. 3, 
London. 
International Monetary Fund, 2013, World Economic Outlook April 2013, World Economic and 
Financial Surveys, International Monetary Fund, Washington. 
Kanda, D., 2010, Asset Booms and Structural Fiscal Positions: The Case of Ireland, International 
Monetary Fund, Washington. 
Matier, C., 2011, A Comparison of Finance Canada and PBO Estimates of the Government of 
Canada's Structural Budget Balance, Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer, Ottawa. 
McDonald, T., Yan, Y H., Ford, B., and Stephan, D., 2010, Estimating the structural budget balance 
of the Australian Government, Treasury Economic Roundup Issue 3, Canberra. 
OECD, 2006, Should Measures of Fiscal Stance be Adjusted for Terms of Trade Effects, OECD 
Publishing, OECD Economics Department Working Papers No. 519, Paris. 
24 
OECD, 2012,  OECD Economic Surveys: Australia 2012, OECD Publishing, Paris. 
Office for Budget Responsibility, 2011, Estimating the output gap, Office for Budget Responsibility, 
Briefing paper No. 2, London. 
Office for Budget Responsibility, 2012, Fiscal sustainability report, The Stationery Office Ltd., 
London. 
Office for Budget Responsibility, 2012, How we present uncertainty, Office for Budget 
Responsibility, Briefing paper No. 4, London. 
Parkyn, O., 2010, Estimating New Zealand's Structural Budget Balance, New Zealand Treasury, NZ 
Treasury Working Paper 10/08, Wellington. 
Price, R., and Dang, T., 2011, Adjusting fiscal balances for asset price cycles, OECD Economic 
Department Working Papers No. 868, Paris. 
The Treasury, 2009, Treasury Briefing Paper for the Senate Inquiry into the Economic Stimulus 
Package, The Treasury, Canberra. 
The Treasury, 2012, Review of Treasury macroeconomic and revenue forcasting, The Treasury, 
Canberra. 
 
